The recent Auditor General's report on the fast ferry mega-flop is a brilliant case study and fascinating ferry tale wrapped up into one - the tale of an reckless Glen Clark combined with a "What - me worry " cabinet that surrounded him while he was both minister in charge and then later as Premier. George Morfitt's analysis on the lack of justification for the taxpayer high-dive into murky fiscal ferry waters should cause British Columbians to re-examine why governments should be allowed crown corporations to begin with.

It is worth diving into the latest taxpayer shipwreck to examine what the Auditor General found on Glen Clark's Titanic. Once the government decided to interfere (more than usual) in the decisions taken by BC Ferries, the initial caution shown by the crown corporation scattered. The AG points to a March 1994 'hostile takeover,' where the Crown Corporations Secretariat took over BC Ferries' control over the Mid Island Transportation Strategy, as key. That event, initiated by Glen Clark, meant that political ideology, favours to labour allies, and photo-ops became more important than passengers and taxpayers. Thus, the next time you're in one of those two-sailing waits for a ferry, thank politicians who put special interests over widespread public interest.

As opposed to BC Ferries' original plan, which called for leasing a fast ferry to see how the critter would sail in BC's waters, Glen Clark and Co. instead decided to try and re-build BC's ship-building industry. That delusion of grandeur led to, according to the Auditor General: Incomplete information being supplied to both the board of BC Ferries and the company set up to build the ferries; incomplete engineering plans supplied to builders which caused further delays and cost over-runs; estimates of per ship costs being manipulated by the Secretariat; and wildly optimistic ship-building schedules unknown to companies who had actually built similar vessels.

Thus, ships that were supposed to cost $70 million - a cute little estimate provided by the secretariat after it disposed of the first higher estimate of $80 million - ended up at $154 million each, and change. A $210 million project, supposed to be worth 41% of BC Ferries capital construction budget, is now worth $462 million, or 72% of that budget.

And unfortunately, the higher costs don't end there. The Auditor General's report points out that the direct operating cost per vehicle is $31 for a fast ferry, $24 for a conventional vessel. Add on interest on capital, terminal costs, and overhead costs, and the total operating costs per vehicle is $81 for the fast ferries. And the leisurely, bigger, more-outside-deck, more-children's-space, non-sewage-dumping, more spacious (in some cases) conventional ferries They run at about $51 per vehicle.

The ferry disaster makes the painful point that for taxpayers, the fewer crown corporations the better, especially when the government in power regards them as play-toys in their collective bathtub. Ironically, ferries are probably one of the few areas where governments may have maximum - though not watertight - justification for ownership, at least if one sees them as an extension of the provincial highways system.

One last note: the Auditor General points out that fast ferries could only have been justified vis-à-vis conventional ferries if the fast ones could be constructed at a maximum cost of $78 million each. Since the fast ferries are $154 million each, that's $76 million more (times three) than would have been necessary, prudent, or responsible. Call it the triple somersault taxpayer high-dive. No wonder taxpayers' necks feel soar on this one.